SOURCE: “Plotinus and Language,” in The Cambridge Companion to Plotinus, edited by Lloyd P. Gerson, Cambridge University Press, 1996, pp. 336-55.

In the following essay, Schroeder explores how Plotinus dealt with the limitations of language in describing the principle of the One.

I Representation

Plotinus's highest metaphysical principle, the One or Good, is ineffable (V.3.13.1; cf. V.3.14.1-8; V.5.6.11-13; VI.9.5.31-2).¹ Indeed, Plotinus is hesitant to attribute “good,” “is” (VI.7.38.1-2), or even “one” (VI.9.5.30-3) to it. If the heart of his philosophical enterprise is to make meaningful statements about this principle, and furthermore our understanding of all else is informed by it, we may well ask why, in the light of this apparent despair of language, he would continue in his quest (his work extends to nine hundred and seventy-four pages of Oxford text).²

Of course, in saying that the One is ineffable, Plotinus has already...