SOURCE: "Reductionism in Ethics and Science: A Contemporary Look at G. E. Moore's Open-Question Argument," in American Philosophical Quarterly, Vol. 25, No. 3, July, 1988, pp. 197-213.

In the following essay, Ball argues that Moore's "open-question " against ethical naturalism is flawed but, ultimately, valid.

The so-called "open question" argument is an argument against a general meta-ethical theory, or group of theories, known as ethical naturalism, according to which statements about what is morally right or wrong are reducible or equivalent in meaning to certain statements about empirical facts of nature. The standard objection to Moore's argument is that it is question-begging or circular. While this objection is currently accepted by ethicists, it has been recently objected that Moore's argument is in fact logically invalid, since it would yield inaccurate results if applied to established reductionist identities in science. Part I of the present essay examines, and rejects, the version of this...