SOURCE: "Moore's Paradox: A Wittgensteinian Approach," in Mind, Vol. 103, No. 409, January, 1994, pp. 5-24.

In the following essay, Heal advances the thesis that Moore's paradox makes more sense when approached with Wittgenstein's theory.

I

"I believe that it is raining but it isn't." It would be perfectly absurd, claimed Moore, to say this or its like. But why? After all, it is clearly possible that I should believe that it is raining when it is not, that others should realise and remark on the error I make. Why should my doing so myself be somehow absurd?

My aim in this paper is to suggest that Wittgenstein's approach to this issue has much to recommend it and that seeing its attraction might provide an entry point to understanding the nature of Wittgenstein's later philosophy of mind. A proper account of that is clearly beyond the scope of this paper and...