SOURCE: “Husserl's and Peirce's Phenomenologies: Coincidence or Interaction,” in Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, Vol. XVII, No. 1, September, 1956, pp. 164-85.

In the following essay, Spiegelberg compares the phenomenological philosophies of Husserl and Charles Sanders Peirce, and explores the extent of each philosopher's awareness of and influence upon the other's work.

Until the late thirties, phenomenology in today's sense of the term was for American philosophy a “foreign affair.” To this generalization there is only one possible exception: the phenomenology of Charles Sanders Peirce.¹ True, the mere absence of the word from the works of other American philosophers does not prove the absence of the thing so designated. Thus the psychology of William James and the philosophy of George Santayana contain many phenomenological ingredients without the trademark. On the other hand, the mere presence of the name “phenomenology” in Peirce's writings constitutes no guarantee that it meant the same thing...