SOURCE: “Some Aspects of Mind and the Problem of Knowledge in Chu Hsi's Philosophy,” in Journal of Chinese Philosophy, Vol. 9, No. 1, March, 1982, pp. 11-43.

In the essay below, Wittenborn studies Chu Hsi's theory of the mind, maintaining that although the theory represents the least successful facet of Chu Hsi's philosophical synthesis, his investigation of this issue resulted in a theory of knowledge rooted in a “firm psychological foundation.” Wittenborn further contends that Chu Hsi argues convincingly for the existence of li, or constitutive principle, rather than simply presupposing its existence, as did many of his predecessors and contemporaries.

There is a great deal of difficulty in understanding such basic Neo-Confucian concepts as jen, tao, and li largely because of their fundamental simplicity in the sense that they are vast, sweeping and comprehensive, and hence very vague and not easily defined or precisely delineated. In contrast, mind (or “the...