SOURCE: Dunn, Francis M. “Antiphon on Time (B9 D-K).” American Journal of Philology 117, no. 1 (1996): 65-69.

In the following essay, Dunn argues that the attribution of a fragment defining the nature of time to Antiphon the Sophist is valid.

The simplest and clearest formulation of Antiphon's understanding of time is the statement that time is a concept or measure, not a substance (87 B9 Diels-Kranz). This fragment is regularly cited in discussions of Antiphon, but Richard Sorabji has stated that it belongs not to Antiphon the sophist but to a minor peripatetic. He gives no argument in support of this statement,¹ but given the potential importance of this fragment both for the views of Antiphon and for early theories of time, we must consider whether or not its attribution is secure.

Antiphon or Antiphanes?

Fragment 9 in Diels-Kranz is a brief entry from the Placita of Aetius (1.22.6) under the heading Πεϱὶ οὐs...